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CRIMINAL ANTITRUST COMES TO THE
GLOBAL MARKET
DONALD C. KLAWITER*
Despite the headlines trumpeting the antitrust battles of Mi-
crosoft and Intel and the merger explosion of the mid-1990's, the
most significant and enduring antitrust enforcement initiative of
this era will be the aggressive criminal enforcement of interna-
tional cartels by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice ("Division"). 1 The Antitrust Division leadership heralds
the detection and criminal prosecution of international cartels as
its highest enforcement priority.2 And why not? The sheer size
* Mr. Klawiter received both his undergraduate and law degrees from the University
of Pennsylvania in 1972 and 1975, respectively. He is currently a partner at Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP in Washington, D.C. where he heads the Antitrust Practice Group
in the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Section. Mr. Kiawiter has represented corpora-
tions and individuals in a number of the Antitrust Division's international cartel investi-
gations.
1 See Charged With International Conspiracies, Three Companies to Pay Second
Largest Fine in Antitrust History, Dep't of Justice News Release, Dec. 22, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 784634, at *1 [hereinafter International Conspiracies] (noting that Antitrust
Division's highest priority in criminal enforcement is to prosecute international cartels
that harm Americans); Justice Department's Ongoing Probe Into the Food and Feed Addi-
tive Industry Yields Second Largest Fine Ever, Dep't of Justice News Release, Jan. 29,
1997, available in 1997 WL 38106, at *2 (stating Antitrust Division's top priority is
prosecuting international cartels); see also Scott Ritter, U.S. Accelerates Actions Target-
ing Foreign Cartels, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1998, at B9 (noting that Antitrust Division is
putting increasing emphasis on prosecuting anticompetitive international cartels).
2 See Joel I. Klein, The Importance of Antitrust Enforcement in the New Economy,
Address Before the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 29, 1998), available in 1998
WL 211240, at *1 (noting that globalization of economy has required internationalization
of antitrust enforcement); Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Anti-
trust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, Address at Fordham Corporate
Law Institute 24th Annual Conference on International Law and Policy (Oct. 16, 1997),
available in 1997 WL 662508, at *3 [hereinafter Anticipating the Millennium] (stating
that recent antitrust success stories are "wake-up call" for both enforcers and consumers
to reality that bulk of fines imposed in international price-fixing schemes rather than
domestic had rigging cases common in 1980's); Joel I. Klein, Criminal Enforcement in a
Globalized Economy, Address Before the ABA Advanced Criminal Antitrust Workshop
(Feb. 20, 1997), available in 1997 WL 71437, at *5-6 [hereinafter Criminal Enforcement
in Globalized Economy] (discussing high priority placed on antitrust criminal enforce-
ment); Sharon Walsh, Food Additives Price-Fixing Probe Nets Two More Guilty Pleas;
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of the international markets make these investigations irre-
sistible. The Division's success in major prosecutions and the
size of the corporate sentences obtained have gained the atten-
tion and respect of corporate executives around the world. The
Division has seized every opportunity to extend, or at least
stretch, the territorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws and has
conducted its investigations with the cooperation of governments
around the world. The prospect of European and Asian citizens
cooperating in U.S. criminal investigations and submitting to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts was unthinkable five years ago.
Today, rather than declining the Division's invitation to partici-
pate in antitrust enforcement proceedings, these individuals
agree to provide testimony in U.S. courts in exchange for lenient
treatment by U.S. antitrust enforcement and immigration
authorities. 3
I. WHY THE EMPHASIS ON INTERNATIONAL CARTEL CASES?
Four major developments are responsible for this dramatic and
intensive emphasis on prosecuting international cartel cases un-
der the criminal antitrust laws. First, the Antitrust Division has
had enormous success in prosecuting large, highly publicized in-
ternational cartel cases and in persuading the antitrust bar that
these cases merely represent the tip of the iceberg. Second, after
the GE Diamond debacle in 1994,4 the Division took substantial
Swiss Chemical Companies to Pay $25 million in Fines for Role in Global Citric Acid
Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1997, at 1 (quoting Antitrust Division's Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General, Gary R. Spratling, who stated that Division's top priority is to
investigate and prosecute international cartels that violate Antitrust laws); see also Mi-
chael B. Himmel et. al., Victims May 'Collude' to Contest Dumping: The No-
err-Pennington Doctrine Can Protect Firms that Join to Threaten Antidumping Action,
NAT'L L. J., Mar. 31, 1997, at 1 (breaking up international cartels involving both foreign
and domestic defendants has become top priority of Antitrust Division).
3 See John E. Daniel et. al., U.S.: Japanese Companies Enter Pleas, Agree to Cooper-
ate in Major U.S. Criminal Antitrust Investigation, BUS. MONITOR, Aug. 29, 1997, at 5
(discussing six foreign defendants' decisions to enter into cooperation agreements with
U.S. government); Anne Marriot, Concentrating on Antitrust Cases, Justice Wields Big
Fines, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at B4 (reporting that foreign executives in antitrust
cases are more likely to cooperate since they will be allowed to keep their travel privi-
leges in United States); see also Japanese Chemical Giant to Pay $20 Million Fine: Penal-
ties from International Conspiracy Cases Top $250 Million in One Year, Dep't of Justice
News Release, Feb. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 86752, at *1 (reporting that two
Japanese defendants in international antitrust case have agreed to cooperate with De-
partment of Justice's investigation).
4 See United States v. General Elec. Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285, 1301 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(granting General Electric's motion for judgment of acquittal because government could
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steps to obtain evidence outside of the United States with sub-
stantial cooperation from non-U.S. companies and executives.
Third, the courts expressly confirmed the broad criminal juris-
dictional scope of the Sherman Act over companies and conduct
outside of the United States. Fourth, many other nations have
begun to work closely with the United States to detect and
eliminate international cartels. Together these four causes have
created a powerful enforcement trend that literally did not exist
in the early 1990's.
A. The Successful Prosecution of High Profile International
Cases
The defining moment that brought international cartels to the
center stage of U.S. antitrust enforcement was the public disclo-
sure of the FBI investigation of the Archer-Daniels- Midland
Company ("ADM").5 The bizarre, tabloid-like tale of ADM senior
executive Mark Whiteacre's participation in the undercover in-
vestigation6 and the morality play that was subsequently pre-
sented in a Chicago courtroom will alter forever the antitrust en-
forcement landscape. The investigations and convictions in the
lysine and citric acid markets resulted in roughly $200 million in
fines against companies and individuals on three continents and
a rare antitrust criminal trial with an international audience
that resulted in the conviction of the high-level ADM officials.
Although highly sensationalized, the food and feed additives
cases were not the first of the 1990's international cartel cases.
not prove that defendant, Loitier, was acting on behalf of defendant, DeBeers, in further-
ance of price-fixing scheme since government's case was frustrated by fact that three
named defendants, DeBeers, Peter Frenz and Philippe Loitier were beyond territorial
jurisdiction of court); see also Dale J. Montpelier, Diamonds Are Forever? Implications of
United States' Antitrust Statutes on International Trade and the DeBeers Diamond Car-
tel, 24 CAL. W. INtL L.J. 277, 299 (1994) (explaining how DeBeers, foreign defendant,
was able to avoid U.S. jurisdiction); Stephen J. Squeri, Government Investigation and
Enforcement: Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission, in 37TH ANNUAL
ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE, at 539, 612 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Se-
ries No. 942, 1996) (stating that after government's loss in General Electric case there
was increase in cooperation with foreign governments to aid international enforcement).
5 See Howard Adler, Jr. & David J. Laing, The Explosion of International Criminal
Antitrust Enforcement, 4 No. 2 BUS. CRIMES BULL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. 1, 1 (1997)
(indicating public impact of ADM's fine of $100 million); Tracey Maclin, Informants and
the Fourth Amendment, a Reconsideration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 573 (1996) (explaining
that public learned that FBI had been investigating ADM for alleged price-fixing).
6 See Mark Whiteacre, My Life as a Corporate Mole for the FBI, FORTUNE, Sept. 4,
1995, at 52 (providing detailed first person account of antitrust conspiracy).
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Slowly and quietly through the early 1990s, the Antitrust Divi-
sion prosecuted the fax paper cases, where several Japanese cor-
porations and a Japanese official were convicted, and a U.S. cor-
poration and official where acquitted, of price-fixing. 7 This was
followed by the plastic dinnerware cases, where the Royal Ca-
nadian Mounted Police executed a search warrant on the offices
of a Canadian target simultaneously with the execution of search
warrants on target companies in the United States. In that case,
the senior officers in the Canadian company were convicted of
price-fixing in a U.S. Court and actually served jail sentences in
the United States.8
The food and feed additives cases of 1996 and 1997, however,
were a dramatic departure from these earlier cartel cases. The
level of publicity and anticipation surrounding these cases was
enormous. Never before had the public been treated to the inti-
mate details of such a wide-reaching antitrust conspiracy. Mr.
Whiteacre's disclosures painted a fascinating story of interna-
tional intrigue and the Division's prosecutorial tactics, including
the well-publicized and dramatic tapes of competitor meetings.
Because of the substantial amount of commerce involved in
these cases-almost $2 billion-the Antitrust Division saw the
opportunity to make "the punishment fit the crime," a feat that
could not be accomplished by imposing only the Sherman Act's
maximum fine of $10 million. Empowered by the strength of its
extensive tape and testimony evidence, the Antitrust Division for
7 See United States v. Mitsubishi Paper Mills Ltd., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
45,095, Case No. 4169 (D. Mass. 1995) (imposing $3.5 million fine); United States v. Kan-
zaki Specialty Papers, Inc., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,094, Case No. 4086 (D. Mass.
1994) (imposing over $6 million in fines); see also Chung-In Choi et. al., Antitrust Viola-
tions, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 375, 407 (1997) (stating that fax paper cases exemplify Anti-
trust Division's success with using international cooperation to help prosecute cases);
Joel I. Klein & Preeta Bensal, International Antitrust Enforcement in the Computer In-
dustry, 41 VILL. L. REV. 173, 173 (1996) (citing fax paper case as example of how inter-
national cooperation can work to uncover and prosecute international price-fixing con-
spiracies).
8 See United States v. Plastics, Inc. et. al., 1988-96 Transfer Binder, U.S. Antitrust
Cases (CCH) 1 45,094, Cases Nos. 4070, 4071, 4072, 4073 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (pleading
guilty); see also Plastic Dinnerware Price-Fixing Probe Nets Indictment, Guilty Plea
Agreements, 66 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 661, 661 (1994) (explaining that top three
manufacturers of plastic dinnerware in United States and four top executives agreed to
plead guilty in Pennsylvania federal court); Gary R. Spratling, A Practical Approach to
Criminal Investigations: Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Against International Cartels,
Address Before the ABA Advanced Criminal Antitrust Workshop (Feb. 21, 1997) (visited
Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/grs97221.htm> (discussing in-
vestigation and rigorous prosecution of cartels).
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the first time under the current sentencing statute invoked the
alternative sentencing provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) to calcu-
late the applicable fine in an antitrust case. That provision
authorizes a maximum fine based on twice the gain derived from
the unlawful conduct or at twice the loss by persons, other than
the defendant, as a result of the unlawful conduct.9 Since its
success in invoking this provision in the food and feed additives
case, the Division has effectively sought to make the "twice the
gain, twice the loss" standard the new norm in antitrust cases.
The potential impact of the future use of section 3571(d) in
criminal antitrust cases is enormous. Under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, for example, virtually any company whose sales
during the alleged antitrust conspiracy exceeded $25 million
could now face a fine above the current statutory maximum of
$10 million.10
B. New Antitrust Division Strategies to Obtain Cooperation
in International Cases
While the high drama of Mark Whiteacre's revelations in For-
tune generated intense interest in the two-year FBI undercover
investigation into the food and feed additives industry, the real
success of these prosecutions can be attributed to the new
strategies and initiatives employed by the Antitrust Division to
enhance its success in these cases.
In 1994, the Antitrust Division prosecuted a major interna-
tional cartel case, United States v. General Electric Company.11
At the close of the government's case, the court directed the ver-
dict for GE. 12 This represented a major loss for the Antitrust
Division and resulted from the Division's inability to compel key
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1998) (extending maximum fines to greater of either twice
gross gain or twice gross loss from conduct).
10 See Spratling, supra note 8 (setting forth this calculation under Sentencing
Guidelines that can make companies members of "ten million dollar club"); see also Gary
R. Spratling, Are the Recent Titanic Fines in Antitrust Just the Tip of the Iceberg, Ad-
dress Before the 12th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crimes (Mar. 6, 1998),
available in 1998 WL 113821, at *12 (stating that Antitrust Division supports Congress'
proposal to amend Sherman Act to raise maximum fine from $10 million to $100 million).
11 869 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
12 See General Electric, 869 F. Supp. at 1301 (stating that "[iut would have been diffi-
cult for the government to prove its case even in the best of circum-
stances... [particularly] [h]ere.. .because three of the four named witnesses, [were] for-
eign nationals beyond the jurisdiction of this court").
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foreign defendants and witnesses to submit to the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts. 13 Significantly, GE defended itself in the lawsuit
while its co-defendant, DeBeers, and two individual defendants
from Europe did not even appear at the trial. The court ex-
plained that GE prevailed because the government had not
linked one of the individual defendants to DeBeers. The court
found that the lack of specific testimony regarding relationships
with DeBeers was fatal to the Division's case. 14 The lesson for
the Antitrust Division was simple: It had to develop the evidence
needed to try its cases through new investigative tactics and en-
sure that the evidence would be available in the United States at
the time of trial.
The Antitrust Division has remedied this major problem in
two ways. First, in its undercover investigation in the lysine
case, the Division effectively used electronic surveillance, includ-
ing video surveillance of actual meetings between competitors, to
develop direct, eyewitness evidence against individuals who
might never submit to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. 15 The
tapes were the key evidence that established the Division's case
at trial. The Division now has the reputation of employing very
sophisticated crime detection tools in its investigations.
Second, the Antitrust Division determined how to obtain un-
precedented cooperation from foreign citizens by getting them to
agree to plead guilty to antitrust charges. Since its evidentiary
failure in the General Electric trial, the Division's primary vehi-
cle for gaining cooperation from foreign citizens has been the
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between the Antitrust
Division and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS"). 16 Until this MOU was signed in 1996, most foreign citi-
13 See Anticipating the Millennium, supra note 2, at *4-5 (noting that while Division
was successful in ADM case because of evidence, comparable it was unable to achieve
level of evidence in GE/DeBeers); Criminal Enforcement in a Globalized Economy, supra
note 2, at *3 (noting difficulty in obtaining evidence and witnesses in multijurisdictional
cases and that "our inability to do that cost us in GE[DeBeers prosecution").
14 See General Electric, 869 F. Supp. at 1291-92.
15 See Greg Burns, Tape at ADM Trial Shows Illegal Deal: Prosecutor Video Focus
Shifts to Michael Andreas, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1998, at 1 (discussing use of videotape in
ADM trial); Kurt Eichenwald, Recordings Played in Trial of 3 Ex-Archer Officials, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1998, at D17 (using tape recordings of conversations).
16 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Antitrust Division, the United
States Department of Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Mar. 15,
1996).
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zens avoided the consequences of criminal antitrust prosecution
in the United States by remaining outside of the United States
or any country with an extradition treaty regarding antitrust
violations; few submitted to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts or
entered pleas of guilty because there was no long-term benefit in
doing so. If the foreign citizen were found guilty or cooperated
with the U.S. authorities, he could still be barred from the
United States by the Immigration and Naturalization Services. 17
The foreign defendant choosing to become a fugitive by failing to
submit to U.S. jurisdiction faced an uncertain future indeed, a
particularly high risk for international business executives "who
put a high premium on their ability to travel without fear of be-
ing detained or arrested."' 8 The foreign citizen opting to appear
in the United States to answer the charges against him faced the
possibility of immediate arrest, conviction, imprisonment and
permanent exclusion from the United States. Under these two
options, unless the foreign defendant was acquitted at trial,
there was virtually no possibility for that individual to even
travel freely to and from the United States again. 19
Neither of these alternatives provided a foreign defendant
with any incentive to submit to U.S. jurisdiction. As a result, the
Antitrust Division was left, in many cases, without a defendant
to try and certainly without the cooperation of key participants
in allegedly criminal conduct. Prior to the enactment of the
MOU, the Division was significantly limited in what it could of-
fer to a cooperative foreign defendant. The new INS policy, how-
ever, provides real incentives for cooperation.
Pursuant to the MOU, the cooperating foreign defendant is
advised of the INS' decision regarding his travel rights to, from
and within the United States in advance of his cooperation.
Moreover, many cooperating foreign defendants were not subject
to actual incarceration. 20 This alternative is extremely attrac-
17 See Spratling, supra note 8 (enumerating three methods by which foreign targets
of U.S. criminal antitrust violations avoided prosecution prior to enactment of MOU).
18 See Spratling, supra note 8 (noting fear of deportation or exclusion as reasons that
"criminal aliens" are sometimes willing to accept responsibility in United States for
criminal conduct in return for promise of future immigration relief).
19 See Spratling, supra note 8 (stating that "an alien convicted of a Sherman Act of-
fense is likely to face deportation and/or permanent exclusion from the United States af-
ter his/her sentence is served").
20 Under the terms of the plea agreements in the food and feed additive cases, the
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tive to an international executive whose business requires free
and frequent mobility. This new enforcement tool was used ef-
fectively in the food and feed additive cases to bring implicated
foreign citizens to the table and obtain their cooperation. 21
Third, an effective border watch strategy has allowed the De-
partment of Justice to limit the U.S. business travel of foreign
citizens who, as present or former employees of companies under
investigation, have knowledge of the activities under investiga-
tion, even if those individuals were not targets of the antitrust
investigation. 22 Individuals who are potential grand jury wit-
nesses may be stopped and detained upon their entry into the
United States. When detained by the INS agents at the border,
these individuals could assist investigations in a number of
ways: (1) they may be interviewed about the subject matter of
the investigation; (2) they may be served with a corporate or in-
dividual subpoena for testimony before the grand jury or for cor-
porate or individual records located abroad; or (3) they could po-
tentially be detained - and imprisoned - until a grand jury
appearance is arranged. While most witnesses fall within the
first two categories, the prospect of awaiting your grand jury ap-
pearance in a federal detention facility is generally so disturbing
that it deters affected individuals from conducting business
within the U.S. borders.
These border watches are powerful disincentives for European,
Asian or Latin American executives traveling to the United
States. Because of these border stops, antitrust counsel now
foreign citizen defendants did not serve jail time, their sentences required only the pay-
ment of fines. See International Conspiracies, supra note 1, at *1 (noting fines that offi-
cials from foreign companies were ordered to pay); Justice Department's Ongoing Probe
Into the Food and Feed Additives Industry Yields Second Largest Fine Ever, Dep't of
Justice News Release, Jan. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 38106, at *1-2 (describing how
executives and general managers of foreign corporations were subject to extensive crimi-
nal antitrust fines).
21 See Spratling, supra note 8 (discussing merits of new MOU). See generally Richard
E. Donovan, International Criminal Antitrust Investigations: Practical Considerations for
Defense Counsel, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 205, 207 (1995) (explaining cooperation DOJ can re-
ceive from foreign corporations when conducting antitrust criminal investigations).
22 See Donovan, supra note 21, at 207 (demonstrating counsel's fears of exposing cli-
ents to arrest or detention because of U.S. border watch). See generally International
Conspiracies, supra note 1, at *1 (noting statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, that "violators of our antitrust laws who are beyond our borders
should not feel safe from prosecution"); Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingham's
Statement Upon the President's Signing of the International Antitrust Enforcement As-
sistance Act (Nov. 2, 1994), available in 1994 WL 601956, at *1 (defining Act's purpose to
allow full cooperation between DOJ, FTC, and foreign antitrust enforcement agencies).
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routinely advise clients to keep executives, who have knowledge
of matters under investigation, out of the United States unless
they can be certain the individual is not on the border watch. 23
Restricting the travel of corporate executives is a very high price
for a corporation to pay because key corporate figures will not be
able to visit customers or corporate operations in the United
States.24
Foreign corporations have also entered into plea agreements
with the Division that are unrelated to the border watches.
These agreements provide all employees (and in some cases for-
mer employees) with the opportunity to cooperate with the Anti-
trust Division in exchange for the promise of free passage into
and out of the United States. Essentially, if an employee makes
himself available and testifies truthfully and completely, that
employee is guaranteed free passage without the threat of de-
tention or additional interrogation. This type of leverage has al-
ready provided the Division with many important witnesses that
were previously not amenable to cooperation. In fact, these pro-
visions were contained in the citric acid and lysine plea agree-
ments to find additional witnesses within the companies. 25
These new enforcement procedures have made it easier for the
Division to obtain foreign evidence, both documentary and testi-
monial. The well-planned strategy executed in the food and feed
additive cases demonstrates that the Division has learned the
lessons of the GE case. As the international cartel investigative
23 See Donovan, supra note 21, at 207 (stating corporate counsel should be careful
not to subject clients to arrest or detention while traveling in United States); Squeri, su-
pra note 4, at 576 (warning that company counsel should inform essential personnel of
pending antitrust criminal investigations and consequences of travel to United States);
A. Paul Victor & Randolph W. Tritell, Antitrust Considerations for U.S. Firms Doing
Business Abroad, in 14TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL: DOING BUSINESS
AND INVESTING ABROAD, at 193, 193 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 752, 1991) (noting that U.S. firms doing business abroad face increasing array of an-
titrust regulations that must be considered in international business planning).
24 Additionally, the border watches may have a negative effect on former employees
of a target company. For example, former employees of the foreign company required to
do business in the United States can be constrained in their new careers by their inabil-
ity to travel to the United States. Moreover, former employees who are stopped, but not
threatened with prosecution, are often quite anxious to cooperate with the Department of
Justice in exchange for free passage. The Antitrust Division prosecutors clearly see these
former employees who must travel to the United States as excellent potential witnesses.
25 See Bayer Unit Agrees to $50 Million Fine in Citric Acid Price Fixing Probe,
ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 8, 8 (Feb. 1997) (describing plea arrangements with
Bayer executive as part of citric acid investigations).
1998]
210 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:201
process expands, the Division will undoubtedly continue to de-
velop new techniques and initiatives on a case-by-case basis.
Practically speaking, this initiative should be a cause of major
concern for foreign and U.S. companies and individuals under
investigation, that were previously protected by the old jurisdic-
tional barriers.
C. The Courts Have Expanded the Jurisdictional Scope of the
Criminal Antitrust Law
On March 17, 1997, a U.S. federal appeals court removed a
major area of uncertainty about the criminal prosecution of for-
eign corporations and their employees under the U.S. antitrust
laws.26 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided
that Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation,
could be found criminally liable for violating the U.S. antitrust
laws even though the company had no operations or personnel in
the United States and the alleged price-fixing activities occurred
completely outside the United States. 27 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court stated that, "wholly foreign conduct which has an
intended and substantial effect in the United States" is subject
to U.S. antitrust laws.28
The Nippon Paper case involved Japanese fax paper manufac-
turers who allegedly fixed the price of thermal fax paper sold in
North America. Every fact giving rise to the cause of action
transpired in Japan: (1) all of the co-conspirators were Japanese
companies; (2) all of the meetings at which prices were allegedly
discussed took place in Japan; (3) all sales to distributors (with
requirements that the paper be resold in North America at
specified prices) occurred in Japan; and (4) all of the monitoring
26 See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998) (expanding Hartford Fire holding such that activities commit-
ted abroad having substantial and intended effects within United States may form basis
for criminal prosecution under section one of Sherman Act). See generally David S.
Copeland, An Overview of Antitrust Enforcement and an Introduction to the Antitrust
Laws Regarding Relationships Among Competitors, in BASIC ANTITRUST LAW, at 7, 102
(PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 865, 1994) (declaring that U.S.
courts have jurisdiction over foreign persons or corporations engaged in conduct that is
anticompetitive in United States).
27 See Nippon Paper, 109 F. 3d at 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding actions committed abroad
which have actual, substantial and foreseeable effect within United States may form ba-
sis for criminal prosecution under Section one of Sherman Act).
28 See Nippon Paper, 109 F. 3d at 1.
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activity of the alleged conspiracy was done in Japan. Relying on
these facts, the trial court dismissed the indictment, holding that
the criminal reach of the Sherman Act does not extend to activi-
ties that take place entirely outside of the United States. 29 The
First Circuit reversed, however, following and expanding the Su-
preme Court's 1993 decision in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Califor-
nia.30 In Hartford Fire, the court held that a foreign defendant
can be held civilly liable for conspiratorial conduct that occurred
entirely outside the United States. Since criminal and civil i-
ability under the Sherman Act are based on the same clause in
the same statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress
must have intended to allow the U.S. Government to prosecute
the foreign criminal activity as well. 31
Further, the Court rejected arguments that it should abstain
from exercising jurisdiction on the basis of international comity,
stating that a nation's decision to prosecute wholly foreign con-
duct is discretionary. The Court reasoned that the growth of in-
ternational comity in the antitrust sphere had been "stunted" by
the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Fire. In Hartford Fire,
the Court suggested that a comity analysis was appropriate only
in those few cases in which the law of the foreign government
required the defendant to act in a manner incompatible with the
Sherman Act, or in which full compliance with both statutory
regimes was impossible. 32 The Court found that the plea for
29 See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 55, 55 (D. Mass.
1996), rev'd, 109 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998).
30 509 U.S. 764, 764 (1993) (holding district court should not have refused to exercise
Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign reinsurers under principles of national comity).
31 See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 5 (analyzing same language of Sherman Act as ap-
plying to both civil and criminal prosecutions); see also United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 n.10 (1992) (rejecting idea that statutory
language with both civil and criminal implications should not be used by courts in both
civil and criminal prosecutions).
32 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests and the Exercise of Ju-
risdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 42,
51 (1995). The author of the portion of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) (1987) relied upon by
the majority in Hartford Fire, has explained that the majority "misunderstood" the ap-
proach of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), and has stated:
In determining whether state A should exercise jurisdiction over an activity signifi-
cantly linked to state B, one important question, in my submission, is whether B has
a demonstrable system of values and priorities different from those of state A that
would be impaired by the application of the law of A. I am not suggesting that, if the
answer to this question is yes, A must stay its hand. The magnitude of A's interest,
the effect of the challenged activity within A, the intention of the actors, and the
other factors that I hope will not disappear from view remain important. But conflict
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comity was weaker in the Nippon case than in Hartford Fire be-
cause, in Hartford Fire, the challenged conduct was lawful in
England. In contrast, this case addressed conduct that was ille-
gal in both the U.S. and Japan.
Reviewing the specific provisions of the Restatement of For-
eign Relations Law, 33 the Nippon Paper Court held that the in-
dictment met the general test of "reasonableness" because it al-
leged a price fixing conspiracy within the United States:
We see no tenable reason why principles of comity should
shield the defendant from prosecution. We live in an age of
international commerce, where decisions reached in one cor-
ner of the world can reverberate around the globe in less
time than it takes to tell the tale. Thus, a ruling in [the de-
fendant's] favor would create perverse incentives for those
who would use nefarious means to influence markets in the
United States, rewarding them for erecting as many territo-
rial firewalls as possible between cause and effect. 34
This ruling could not have come at a better time for the Anti-
trust Division. For three years, Division leaders 35 had been pur-
suing international cartel behavior relentlessly and have ag-
gressively expanded the investigation and prosecution of
international cartel conduct. Nippon Paper effectively removed
the last major jurisdictional hurdle of the U.S. antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Nippon Paper.36 A
major showdown over this issue is not likely, however, unless a
better factual test is devised. On the facts of Nippon Paper, the
Antitrust Division has its mandate to pursue international cases
and it will certainly continue to do so. For the immediate future,
foreign corporate boards and executives should be aware that
Antitrust Division cartel investigations will continue to pose a
is not just about commands: it is also about interests, values and competing priori-
ties. All of these need to be taken into account in arriving at a rational allocation ofjurisdiction in a world of nation-states.
Id.
33 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403 (1987).
34 See Nippon Paper, 109 F. 3d at 5.
35 See Spratling, supra note 8 (addressing criminal antitrust enforcement against
international cartels); Antitrust in a More Conservative Congress, NO. 3 ANTITRUST BULL.
541, 552 (1996) (prosecution of international price-fixing cartels is top priority of Divi-
sion's criminal enforcement program).
36 118 S.Ct. 685 (1998).
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significant threat, notwithstanding the fact that all of the alleg-
edly anticompetitive behavior occurred outside U.S. borders.
D. International Agreements Have Provided More Avenues for
the Antitrust Division to Obtain Substantial Cooperation
As with other aspects of its cartel wars, the Antitrust Division
has enlisted, and is obtaining, the cooperation of former adver-
saries in this war, specifically, the sovereign governments of
many nations.
Slowly, and primarily behind the scenes, the United States has
sought to develop additional mutual legal assistance treaties and
cooperation agreements with many other countries and interna-
tional agencies. It has utilized the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), as well as participating
in bilateral discussions with many countries to establish various
cooperation agreements. Negotiations have focused on making
global antitrust enforcement more efficient and on increasing in-
formation exchanges among antitrust authorities.
The European Commission and the U.S. antitrust authorities
have signed a "positive comity" agreement, 37 that represents a
further elaboration on the principles of "positive comity" set forth
in Article V of the 1991 EC/U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agree-
ment.38 The agreement creates a presumption that one party
will not take action against anticompetitive conduct that does
37 See Draft Agreement Between the European Community and the Government of
the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the En-
forcement of their Competition Laws (1997). See generally James R. Atwood, Positive
Comity-Is It a Positive Step?, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 79, 79 (1992) (discussing
theory of comity as applied to international law enforcement); Robert P. Shrank, The
Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy: Toward a 'Positive Comity'
Solution to International Competition Problems, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 155
(1996) (describing concept of asking country to enforce its antitrust laws against local
conduct that adversely effects another country's interests). See, e.g., Agreement between
U.S. and Canadian Government Regarding the Application of Their Competition and De-
ceptive Marketing Practices Laws, art. V(2), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 309, 317 (Mar. 1996)
(setting forth similar "positive comity" provision).
38 See Agreement Between the U.S. and the Commission of the European Communi-
ties Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, art. V(2), re-
printed in 59 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 382 (1991). See generally Joseph P. Griffin,
ECI U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact on Transnational Business, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1051, 1051 (1993). In August 1994, the European Court of Justice held
that the European Commission did not have the power to conclude the antitrust agree-
ment, in France v. Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 517, 517 (1994). A virtually identical agree-
ment authorized by the European Council of Ministers was entered into in April 1995,
1995 O.J. (L 95/45), corrected, 1995 O.J. (L 131/38).
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not directly harm it or that principally occurs in or is directed
towards the other. Instead, the party that decides to defer en-
forcement of its own laws for one of these reasons will request
that the other party investigate and, if appropriate, sanction the
conduct. The agreement seeks to make global competition en-
forcement more efficient by placing primary enforcement re-
sponsibility in the hands of the country most harmed by the in-
ternational cartel behavior. 39
In addition to the positive comity agreements, the U.S. Gov-
ernment is also negotiating agreements with other Governments,
pursuant to the 1994 International Antitrust Enforcement Assis-
tance Act,40 to greatly expand the exchange of information
among antitrust enforcement authorities around the world. The
first such agreement, with Australia, was announced on April
17, 1997.4 1 That agreement allows U.S. and Australian anti-
trust authorities to "assist one another and to cooperate on a re-
ciprocal basis in providing or obtaining antitrust" evidence.
However, domestic confidentiality laws are still applicable and
limit the scope of exchangeable information.
While these arrangements are extremely important building
blocks for fighting future cartels, the current successes of the
Antitrust Division has resulted from "cartel-specific agreements"
where the United States and other governments have shared in-
formation, coordinated enforcement actions, such as execution of
searches for documents, assisted in locating and contacting wit-
nesses and similar initiatives. 42 Although none of these activi-
39 See Justice Department Closes Investigation Into the Way AC Nielsen Contracts Its
Services for Trading Retail Sales, Dep't of Justice News Release, Dec. 3, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 692701, at *1 (detailing problematic contract practices of A.C. Nielsen that
will be investigated and prosecuted only by EU authorities).
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12. See generally Laurie N. Freeman, U.S. Canadian Inforna-
tion-Sharing and the IAEAA, 84 GEO. L.J. 339, 342 (1995) (analyzing necessity of broad
evidentiary rules in enforcing criminal antitrust actions); Charles S. Stark, International
Antitrust Cooperation in NAFTA The IAEAA, 4 U.S.-MExIcO L.J. 169, 169 (1996)
(outlining Act and its goal of international cooperation among antitrust authorities).
41 See International Enforcement to be Boosted by New Agreement with Australia
(visited Mar. 8, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/art/public/press-releases/1997> (detailing
antitrust enforcement agreement between United States and Australia).
42 See Dominic Bencivenga, International Antitrust Nations Respond to Greater Need
for Cooperation, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 23, 1997, at 5 (remembering 1997 as year of remarkable
international cooperation); Daniel, supra note 3, at *1 (detailing international coopera-
tion in investigation of feed additives industry); David Lasky, U.S. Seeks International
Pacts to Guard Against Price Fixing, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 5, 1997, at 14a
(discussing record cooperation in citric acid antitrust cases).
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ties has the force of a treaty or even the stature of a cooperation
agreement, these informal arrangements can open the door to
cooperation and lead to the discovery of important evidence. The
simultaneous execution of search warrants, in the United States
and abroad, for example, has now occurred several times, involv-
ing the Canadian authorities and EC and national competition
agencies of several European countries. Similarly, foreign gov-
ernments have assisted the United States in finding witnesses
abroad. The prospect of facing investigation in the United
States, Canada, the EC, and even Japan has occurred in major
cartel investigations in the past two years. In this area, the
United States has proposed to the OECD that it work toward an
agreed recommendation to member countries to enforce laws
prohibiting cartel activity, and to enter bilateral or multilateral
agreements to share investigative information in such cases. 43
Despite the fact that these cooperation agreements are begin-
ning to solve some of the Antitrust Division's evidentiary prob-
lems, they are only limited successes to date. In many situa-
tions, the Antitrust Division is still thwarted in its attempt to
obtain evidence found in other countries and to arrange for wit-
nesses to testify in its proceedings.
Finally, the Antitrust Division has been requesting voluntary
production of foreign located documents that the Antitrust Divi-
sion subpoenas from the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corpora-
tions. The basis of these requests is that the Antitrust Division
will be able to obtain these documents through international dis-
covery or with the assistance of national competition authorities
if the party does not provide them voluntarily. Over the past few
years, there have been situations where the Antitrust Division
has obtained documents from foreign governments through dawn
raids. Clearly, the Antitrust Division is making a significant ef-
fort to obtain assistance from other nations as a means to per-
suade companies to comply voluntarily with its subpoenas. It is
still too early to tell whether these initiatives will be effective
and how often other nations will assist the United States against
their own citizens. The simple fact is that foreign governments
have been cooperative with the U.S. authorities who are seeking
43 See Spratling, supra note 10, at *5-6 (discussing incentives for multi-national
agreement regarding shared investigations).
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criminal antitrust prosecutions of their citizens. Five years ago,
such cooperation would have been impossible.
II. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS
This analysis of international cartel investigations takes place
in mid-stream. The Antitrust Division has had some enormous
successes and currently has a considerable pipeline filled with
international cartel investigations. 44 The public does not know
the identity of most of these matters since the Division properly
does not release information about on-going criminal investiga-
tions. We do know, however, from speeches and statements by
the Division's leadership that over thirty grand juries are inves-
tigating international cartel matters. Those investigations rep-
resent at least 30%, and probably over 50% of all the criminal
investigative activities being conducted under the antitrust laws
today. This is truly monumental considering that there were
virtually no such cartel investigations in 1991 or 1992. This
trend is likely to continue.
The impact of these investigations and cases on future en-
forcement, on international cooperation, and on deterrence are
substantial issues that will clearly play themselves out over the
next five years. Given the early success of the Antitrust Divi-
sion's program it is possible at this point to make some prelimi-
nary comments on these investigations and cases and their im-
pact on promoting and enhancing competition.
A. Proportionality
In evaluating armed conflicts, philosophers and theologians
have long analyzed the doctrine of proportionality as a guide to
the propriety of combatants' actions. Similarly, the Antitrust
Division must remain vigilant to launch prosecutions that are
appropriate to the offense. Importantly, the Antitrust Division
must continue to focus its enforcement actions specifically on
conduct directly affecting the U.S. market. In many of these in-
44 See Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition: Hearings Before the Subconm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Comm. on the Judiciary United States Sen-
ate Concerning International Antitrust Enforcement, (Oct. 2, 1998) (statement of Joel I.
Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division), available in 1998 WL 723684, at
*9 (indicating increased investigation of international cartels).
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ternational cases, the agreements among competitors were much
broader than the U.S. market for these products, although the
U.S. market was clearly part of the agreement. It is imperative,
therefore, that the Antitrust Division leadership define these
cases in terms of their impact on the U.S. consumer. The more
tangential the connection to U.S. commerce is or the more indi-
rect the evidence of a conspiracy involving U.S. commerce is, the
more likely it will be for the Antitrust Division to lose credibility
with the judiciary and with its foreign sovereign partners in
competition law enforcement. For example, if the Antitrust Di-
vision relentlessly pursues small European or Asian companies
that have a tangential role in a global conspiracy and have truly
de minimis sales in the United States, other nations may react
negatively and stop cooperating with the Antitrust Division.
Clearly, the prosecutors must pursue conspiracies, wherever
they are found, that impact the U.S. market; they need not im-
plicate every corporate official who, at one time or another, sold
some product into the United States. If the conspiracy is over-
whelmingly a European arrangement, why not invoke the prin-
ciple of positive comity and refer the matter to the EC? Such ac-
tions would strengthen the international enforcement scheme,
even if it is not a U.S. prosecution. Several foreign competition
authorities have already expressed concern that the United
States is overreaching in marginal investigations. The Antitrust
Division does not want that criticism to ring true in those mat-
ters.
Similarly, U.S. enforcement officials must be realistic when
assessing the effect of conspiracies on the U.S. economy. Sug-
gestions that antitrust prosecutors count the volume of world-
wide commerce in calculating fines or prison sentences under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines is serious overreaching. The U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines should properly reach U.S. commerce, not
all worldwide commerce of the companies. Attempting to punish
companies for the world's commerce may harm relationships
with international enforcement partners that may seek to bring
their own enforcement actions, only to find that the company is
making an ability to pay argument based on the high fines and
damages paid in the United States. It would be ironic if the op-
portunities of foreign governments to bring effective antitrust
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enforcement actions are compromised by their earlier assistance
to U.S. enforcement authorities in the same matter.
The amount of U.S. commerce affected in the international
cartel cases is significant enough without trying to argue that all
the world's sales should be part of the Sentencing Guidelines
formula. Overextending the amount of commerce in these in-
vestigations may have negative consequences because: (1) the
corporate defendants in these actions will believe they are being
treated unfairly; (2) their companies will be weakened finan-
cially under the fines and damages paid to each government and
each plaintiff; and (3) as a result, they will not be able to com-
pete aggressively or, even worse, could be forced out of business.
This would be a perverse result in the name of competition law
enforcement. Additionally, foreign-based corporations with sales
outposts in the United States, a minimal connection to subject
matter jurisdiction in the United States, may decide that doing
business in the United States is not worth the risk. This could
lead to the equally perverse result that aggressive enforcement
of the U.S. antitrust laws actually reduces competition in do-
mestic markets, thereby placing U.S. consumers at a distinct
competitive disadvantage.
Consequently, the Antitrust Division must respond to these is-
sues in designing an effective enforcement strategy. It has con-
sidered and resolved these issues prudently in past situations
knowing that while it is easy to propose severe sentences, it is
not as easy to repair a market weakened by a cure that is worse
than the illness. Proportionality, therefore, is an important
principle for the Antitrust Division to apply to mention the
credibility of its enforcement program throughout the world.
B. Equitable Treatment
A major equitable problem that the U.S. enforcement authori-
ties are facing in the international cartel cases is the disparate
treatment of U.S. corporations and citizens convicted of criminal
antitrust violations from that of non-U.S. citizens convicted of
the same conduct. Based on the results of recent international
cartel cases, it appears quite clear that U.S. citizens, as well as
uncooperative foreign citizens, face substantially greater risks
than foreign citizens who choose to cooperate with the Antitrust
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Division. For example, in several of the recent cartel cases, the
foreign citizens who pled guilty and cooperated with the Anti-
trust Division were fined anywhere between $75,000 and
$225,000 and did not face incarceration. If these individual de-
fendants had been U.S. citizens, however, the Antitrust Division
would have recommended substantial jail sentences of 24
months or more.
Foreign citizens have received far more lenient treatment for
two reasons. First, the U.S. authorities could not obtain subject
matter jurisdiction over those citizens unless they agreed to
submit to the jurisdiction of the U.S. government or were caught
by a border watch. Because of this legal barrier, and because of
the need to obtain evidence from abroad, foreign citizens must be
given some incentive to come to the United States to submit to
the charges and cooperate with the authorities. Second, U.S.
citizens should be more respectful of U.S. antitrust laws and
more faithful to them; therefore, if they break the law they
should be treated far more harshly than foreign citizens who are
less familiar with U.S. law. While both of these arguments have
appeal, they do nothing to eliminate the disparity between a sen-
tence for U.S. citizens as opposed to their European or Asian
counterparts. Assume, for example, that a foreign citizen is the
ringleader and entices a U.S. businessman to join the cartel. It
is quite likely that the foreign citizen can cooperate, pay a fine
and obtain free passage to the United States, while his U.S.
counterpart, cooperating on the same day, and being less culpa-
ble, could serve eighteen months to three years in jail.
One result of this dilemma may be that fewer U.S. citizens will
cooperate and more will proceed to trial. The Antitrust Division
will then face difficult trials where foreign citizens are the chief
government witnesses testifying against U.S. citizens. This does
not present the most attractive enforcement picture to a jury. In
fact, this scenario was played out in the thermal fax paper trial
of U.S. v. Appleton Papers, Inc.45 There, the principal witness
for the United States was a Japanese citizen testifying against a
U.S. citizen defendant. Although there were other issues in the
case, the jury took little time to acquit the U.S. citizen and his
45 No. 95-10388 JLT (E.D. Wisc. filed Dec. 13, 1995).
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company.
What can the Antitrust Division do then to level the playing
field between the U.S. and foreign citizens? Should the Division
provide U.S. citizens who cooperate with the same type of deal
that his foreign counterpart is offered? Should the government
insist on jail time for the non-U.S. citizens where both are
equally culpable?
The disparate treatment of U.S. citizens and foreign defen-
dants has been raised in cases and investigations since Appleton.
As more of these cases are brought, however, this disparity will
increasingly come into focus. This is an issue that the Antitrust
Division leadership and the courts must resolve on a case-by-
case basis. Perhaps the Antitrust Division will conclude that
foreign executives who are the ringleaders or organizers of the
conspiracies must be treated in the same manner as their U.S.
counterparts, even if it sacrifices their cooperation or that of
their corporations. The Antitrust Division and the judiciary cer-
tainly have the ability to develop creative solutions to these mat-
ters to achieve a just and equitable result.
C. Education
The greatest disadvantage that foreign companies and their
officials face in assessing the risk under the U.S. antitrust laws
is the lack of knowledge about the current enforcement environ-
ment. European and Asian citizens, while generally aware of the
tough competition laws in the United States, generally do not
appreciate how far the Antitrust Division has gone in these cases
or how helpful their own governments have been in assisting the
United States in criminal investigations. European and Asian
executives have literally been in a state of shock in situations
where their own governments have compelled information from
them to assist the United States. While the publicity surround-
ing the food and feed additives cases has been helpful, it is far
from sufficient to educate the international businessman. It is
critically important, therefore, that the Antitrust Division, its
sovereign partners around the world, and antitrust and compe-
tition counsel around the world, inform the international busi-
nesses community about the consequences and risks of engaging
in anticompetitive behavior. Multinational companies can no
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longer issue compliance policies that instruct their executives to
follow the law of the country where they are located. United
States executives must also be counseled about the extent to
which U.S. law can reach conduct in other parts of the world.
Many U.S. and European companies still naively believe that if
you meet your competitors outside of the United States and out-
side of an EU member country, you are safe. Both U.S. and non-
U.S. executives must be educated by a new type of antitrust
compliance program that uses the food and feed additives prose-
cutions as a case study.
Every corporation that does business globally must explain the
lessons of the recent cartel cases to its executives. It is clear in
the current cases that executives are not only ignorant of these
developments, but they are shocked and stunned by the state of
enforcement today.
CONCLUSION
The business world continues to shrink daily with the opening
and expansion of global markets. As the business cultures of di-
verse international companies meld together, there is substan-
tial concern that industries will turn to the convenient, and
usually illegal, practice of fixing prices and allocating territories,
production or customers. United States companies should know
better and must be more vigilant in situations where they can be
enticed into joining a conspiracy or a "club," even if, on the sur-
face, it applies only to non-U.S. commerce. Foreign companies,
that are traditionally more comfortable with discussions of price
and restrictions of output, should work with their legal advisors
in the United States and abroad to comply with U.S. antitrust
law as a condition of doing any business in the United States.
This is the only prudent course of action. If the companies are in
the midst of an ongoing price agreement or other cartel relation-
ship, they should withdraw immediately to mitigate their expo-
sure to criminal and civil actions. Their counsel should then as-
sist them in how to deal with continuing possibilities of
investigation or prosecution. These are delicate and difficult is-
sues that U.S. antitrust counsel and European and Asian com-
petition counsel must help a company navigate successfully.
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Clearly, this international cartel enforcement program will
continue into the new millennium, considering the major suc-
cesses and the enormous impact it has had in a very short time
period. Ultimately, however, the Antitrust Division's goal is not
the detection of hundreds of international cartel cases, it is the
elimination of international cartels that harm competition in the
United States and around the world. That is the work yet to be
done.
